Privacy infrastructure · zero-knowledge identity
Prove the claim without handing over the document.
ZKYC pairs a Circom zero-knowledge circuit with a fine-tuned vision model, so a browser can prove an identity claim while the document itself never leaves the device.

THE QUESTION
Identity checks usually mean surrendering the document. The question was whether a claim like “over 18” could be proven to a verifier while the passport stays on the user’s machine.
PROJECT RECORD
Independent project
PRIVATE REPOSITORY01 / WHAT IT DOES
The system
- A Circom 2.0 circuit that validates age, nationality and a document hash, and emits a nullifier so one identity cannot be reused.
- Browser-side Groth16 proving and verification through snarkjs compiled to WebAssembly, so proofs are generated locally.
- A server path that checks document authenticity with a fine-tuned SmolVLM model, exported to ONNX for CPU or GPU inference.
02 / ENGINEERING CHOICES
What shaped it
01
Proving stays client-side
The circuit runs in the browser, so a verifier receives the claim and a proof rather than the document behind it.
02
Nullifiers instead of stored identities
Uniqueness comes from a hash a verifier can check, without the verifier learning who the person is.
03
Keep the two kinds of truth apart
Age and nationality are cryptographic claims from the circuit. Document authenticity is a model judgment, and the design does not pretend they carry the same weight.
03 / SCOPE AND LIMITS
What this does not prove
- This is an SDK and research build, not an audited identity provider.
- Document checks are model judgments with error rates; a valid proof says nothing about whether the underlying document was genuine.
- It implements a verification mechanism, not a compliance regime. Whether a regulator accepts a zero-knowledge claim is a separate question from whether the proof verifies.